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INCENTIVE SYSTEMS IN MULTI-LEVEL MARKETS FOR VIRTUAL GOODS
ANDREAS U. SCHMIDT
ABSTRACT. As an alternative to rigid DRM measures, ways of marketing virtual goods
through multi-level or networked marketing have raised some interest. This report is a
first approach to multi-level markets for virtual goods from the viewpoint of theoretical
economy. A generic, kinematic model for the monetary flow in multi-level markets, which
quantitatively describes the incentives that buyers receive through resales revenues, is
devised. Building on it, the competition of goods is examined in a dynamical, utility-
theoretic model enabling, in particular, a treatment of the free-rider problem. The most
important implications for the design of multi-level market mechanisms for virtual goods,
or multi-level incentive management systems, are outlined.
1. INTRODUCTION
Information goods share the attributes of transferability and non-rivalry with pub-
lic goods, and additionally are durable, i.e., show no wear out by usage or time [1, 2].
Like with a private good, however, original creation can be costly, whereas reproduc-
tion and redistribution are cheap. This is the more true for virtual goods [3], i.e., in-
formation goods in intangible, digital form, which are distributed through electronic
networks. Free-rider phenomena and “piracy” plague their creators and distributors,
a problem which is conventionally approached using copy protection measures and/or
digital rights management (DRM) systems which, generally speaking, aim at restor-
ing some of the features of private, physical goods. This practise, backed by WIPO
treaties [4] and national copyright law in signatory states giving DRM techniques pro-
tected legal status, has aroused public controversy and an ongoing scientific discussion
about its various fundamental [5], economic [6], and pragmatic problems [7], cf. [8] for a
more general discussion of the underlying concepts of intellectual property rights. The
general legitimacy of DRM measures which tend to disrupt consumers’ expectations on
their individual usage of the good [9], is doubtful in light of empirical findings on the
effect of illegal file-sharing on record sales [10], which seems negligible. Therefore, as
an alternative to the protection of virtual goods by DRM, so called incentive manage-
ment (IM) systems have recently emerged. They promise to yield a fair remuneration
to the originator of the good, who may be identical with its creator or not, without ne-
cessitating copy protection or disruption of users’ expectations on “fair” and “personal”
uses. One of the first such systems, and one which is already in practical use is the
so called Potato System [11, 12]. It is based on super distribution of the virtual good
from buyer to buyer, whereby each buyer obtains, along with the good itself, the right
to redistribute it on commission. Upon resale, she will obtain a share of the purchase
price as an additional incentive. The rationale behind this kind of scheme, called here
multi-level IM systems, is as obvious as appealing. Rather than to discourage illegal
distribution of the good by more or less unpopular measures, the aim is to make legal
distribution more attractive than “piracy” [13]. Concurrently, the scheme purports to
attribute a fair remuneration to the party from which the good originated, for instance
the creator of a work of which the virtual good is an embodiment.
The present report contributes a building block to the presently lacking study of
multi-level IM in the framework of theoretical economy. Section 2 introduces a simple
model for the monetary flux in a general multi-level market and derives the most basic
results pertaining to it. The model is complemented by a dynamical model for the
competition of two goods in such a market in Section 3, with particular consideration
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of virtual goods. Two important special cases are treated in Section 4. Section 4.1
covers the free-rider problem and the potential of multi-level IM to counter it, while
Section 4.2 gives a first account of genuine competition between two goods. Section 5
offers a qualitative discussion of the issues raised in the preceding theoretical ones.
It is argued in Section 5.1 that, judged on grounds of the theoretical analysis, multi-
level IM can be a fair scheme despite its similarity to pyramid schemes. The free-
rider problem is recast as an issue of information economy in Section 5.2. Section 5.3
offers some thoughts on the general potential of multi-level IM to influence markets
through determining the incentive via dynamical forward pricing. A particular problem
of multi-level markets, namely cannibalisation by a potent reseller, is alluded to in
Section 5.4. Section 6 concludes by noting some directions for further work. Proofs, and
some technical material, are contained in Appendices A, B, respectively. Figures can be
found at the end of the paper.
2. MONETARY FLUX MODEL
The model we devise is continuous and kinematic in nature. That means firstly,
that we describe all pertinent quantities by variables with continuous range. Secondly,
that it describes the monetary flux between the market players, and other relevant
quantities, such as the expected resales revenue, are to be derived from the kinematics.
About the market players no special assumptions are made, in particular with re-
gard to their decision making processes. That is, the model is neutral with respect to
the detailed structure of the monopolist firm marketing the good (which we called its
originator), and the consumer buying it. Thus the agents are solely discriminated by
the time t at which they enter the market, i.e., buy the good from another agent already
present in it. Consequently, buying the good happens only once for each agent, while
resale can happen to arbitrary amounts at subsequent times. The market in turn is
assumed to be homogeneous, i.e., all agents have equal probability to trade with each
other. In accordance, no special market dynamics is assumed by letting the number
n(t) of agents in the market at time t be an unspecified function with continuous, non-
negative, finite or infinite range. The resales price at time t is denoted by pi(t).
The expected (average) monetary incentive vi for an agent entering the market at
time t is given by
vi(t) = vr(t)− pi(t),
that is, the expected revenue vr from resales to agents entering the market at later
times, diminished by the price at which the good was bought, i.e., the resales price
at time t. To calculate vr, note that the influx of agents into the market is given by
n˙(t′) = dn(t′)/dt′ at any later time t′ > t, and if the agent was alone then one could
integrate pi(t′)n˙(t′) over an interval to obtain the resale revenue accumulated in it.
But since there is competition in the reseller market, and all n(t′) agents have equal
probability to strike a deal with the newcomers, the integrand must be divided by n(t′).
Thus
vr(t) =
∫ ∞
t
pi(t′)
n(t′)
n˙(t′) dt′.
Reparametrisation by the monotonously increasing number of agents n(t), makes the
independence of the market dynamics manifest and yields
vr(n) =
∫ n∞
n
pi(n′)
n′
dn′,
in which the market size n∞ may be finite or infinite.
The model neither specifies all the endogenous and exogenous dynamically changing
factors that may contribute to a complete model of multi-level markets, nor does it
presume any special estimators for them. Accordingly, the fundamental price function
pi, as well as the market dynamics, is left completely unspecified and can be generated
by any underlying mechanism without affecting any general results derived from the
model.
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It is instructive to solve the homogeneous equation vi = 0, corresponding to an ex-
pected balance between resales revenues and buying price. In this case, pi would nec-
essarily have to satisfy the differential equation dpi(n)/dn = −pi(n)/n, the unique solu-
tion of which is pi(n) = pi(0)/n. With this solution however, one obtains vi = −pi(0)/n∞,
showing that this pi is not a solution of the homogeneous equation for n∞ < ∞. The
same reasoning applies to any constant, nonzero vi and it follows that such a situation
is not realisable in a finite market, due to the singular nature of the integral operator
defining vi. Thus it makes sense to specialise to finite markets, i.e., to take n∞ < ∞.
Then, a nonsingular re-parametrisation can be applied, replacing n with the market
saturation s = n/n∞, 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. The integral operator K : pi 7−→ vi, a Volterra operator
of the second kind, is defined by
(Kpi)(s)
def
= vi(s) =
∫ 1
s
pi(s′)
s′
ds′ − pi(s).
As this operator describes a closed market, one would expect it to satisfy a conserva-
tion law. In the present case this law takes the form of a game-theoretical zero-sum
condition.
Proposition 2.1 (Zero-Sum Condition). If pi is bounded then∫ 1
0
vi(s) ds = 0.
The proofs of all statements are easy calculations and are deferred to Appendix A.
The zero-sum condition expresses that wins and losses in incentive compensate each
other exactly. It is also the main reason why the attempt to obtain a nontrivial solution
to the homogeneous equation was bound to fail (notice that pi = pi(0)/n is too singular
at 0 to fall in the scope of Proposition 2.1). One important feature of the model is that
the incentive is scale-free, i.e., does not depend on n∞.
For regular enough pi, the inverse ofK is easily obtained as a solution of the inhomo-
geneous equationKpi = vi. The derivatives of pi, vi, are denoted by p˙i, v˙i, respectively.
Proposition 2.2. K maps V def= C1([0, 1]) bijectively onto
W def=
{
vi ∈ C1((0, 1])
∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
vi = 0, vi = o(
1
s
), and v˙i = O(
1
s
) (s→ 0)
}
.
The inverse of K : V −→ W is
(Kˇvi)(s)
def
= −1
s
∫ s
0
σv˙i(σ) dσ. (1)
Although nothing in principle prevents a forward monetary flow from earlier market
entrants to later ones by negative prices pi < 0, the more conventional case is that
of positive resale prices. According to the inversion formula in Proposition 2.2, it is
sufficient that v˙ is non-positive for pi to remain non-negative, that is positive (non-
negative) prices are always obtained if the incentive is (strictly) monotonic decreasing.
The necessary and sufficient condition for positive prices reads as follows.
Proposition 2.3. Let pi ∈ C1([0, 1]). Then, pi is positive if and only if
1
s
∫ s
0
vi(σ) dσ > vi(s) for all s.
This result has a rather direct interpretation. It says that the monetary flow is
always directed backwards if and only if the expected incentive at a certain time is
smaller than the average expected incentive before that time.
The basic model can easily amended by further features. In particular it is desirable
to take transaction costs and a commission into account. The former can be easily
incorporated as follows. In the resale process, the buyer as well as the seller can incur
transaction costs. We show how both of these additional costs can be incorporated in the
model when they are constant. While the buyer’s transaction cost β ≥ 0 directly adds
to the price pi(s) and can therefore be absorbed in that function, the seller’s transaction
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cost σ ≥ 0 modifies the integrand for the calculation of vr from pi(s)/s to (pi(s) − σ)/s.
Upon integration, this yields a negative contribution in the incentive of the form
vi(s) =
∫ 1
s
pi(s′)
s′
ds′ + σ ln s− pi(s).
If there is an entity, called the collector, which collects part of the resales revenue,
e.g., to remunerate the creator of the good, and pays only part of it as a commission to
resellers, the market turns into an open system. The commission factor 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
diminishes the revenue of a single resale from pi to γpi, and the modified operator Kγ
yielding the incentive vi,γ becomes
(Kγpi)(s) =
∫ 1
s
γ(s′)pi(s′)
s′
ds′ − pi(s).
Its inverse for differentiable pi can still be calculated as
(Kˇγvi,γ)(s) = −e−
∫
s
0
γ(τ)
τ
dτ
∫ s
0
v˙i,γ(σ)e
∫
σ
0
γ(τ)
τ
dτ
dσ. (2)
For constant commission this reduces to
(Kˇγ=const.vi,γ)(s) = − 1
sγ
∫ s
0
v˙i,γ(σ)σ
γ dσ.
The amount of money vc,γ taken out of the market by the collector can be calculated,
e.g., when pi is bounded, as in Proposition 2.1 to obtain
vc,γ =
∫ 1
0
(
(K −Kγ)pi
)
(s) ds =
∫ 1
0
(
1− γ(s′)
)
pi(s′) ds′,
as expected. Note that this quantity is still normalised and the gross commission col-
lected is n∞vc,γ . Themarket with commission no longer satisfies the zero-sum condition
but rather its analogue ∫ 1
0
vi,γ(s) ds = −vc,γ ,
balanced with the collector’s share.
A continuous model is an idealisation of a realistic market where buyers enter one
by one, i.e., the market size evolves in discrete steps. This entails artifacts, most no-
tably the logarithmic singularity for vi(s) as s ց 0 when pi(0) > 0, see Figure 1 a).
Therefore one needs to examine the discrepancy between the incentive obtained from
the continuous model and the one calculated by discrete summation somewhat more
closely. For a constant price pi(s) = pi, the discrete model can be solved directly. Agents
are labelled with k = 1, . . . , n∞, by the order of market entrance, and this yields for the
expected incentive vi of the discrete case
vi = pi
(
n∞∑
k′=k+1
1
k′ − 1 − 1
)
= pi (Ψ(n∞)−Ψ(k)− 1) ,
where the Digamma function Ψ(z) = Γ′(z)/Γ(z) is the logarithmic derivative of the
Gamma function, see [14, p. 39].
In the general case, we have to look at the difference between vi(s) and the discrete
incentive vi(s · n∞) at the corresponding point.
Proposition 2.4. For bounded, non-negative pi holds
|vi(s)− vi(sn∞)| ≤ pimax
2
[
1 + s
sn∞
+
1
6
1 + s2
(sn∞)2
+O
(
1 + s4
(sn∞)4
)]
,
with pimax
def
= maxs∈[0,1] pi(s), and in which the term of order (sn∞)
4 is strictly dominated
by the previous one.
Te error behaviour of the continuous model is rather benign in that it decays with
the inverse of the market size at any finite saturation s > 0. For fixed k = sn∞ on the
other hand, a constant error bounded by ckpimax for some ck > 0, will always remain.
INCENTIVE SYSTEMS IN MULTI-LEVEL MARKETS FOR VIRTUAL GOODS 5
The dynamics of multi-level markets are prone to be influenced, if not dominated, by
network effects [15], and it is desirable to assess how the incentive relates to them. Net-
work effects are understood in the economics literature as the benefit that accrues to a
user of a good or a service because he or she is one of the many who use it. Simple func-
tional forms of network effects for special types of networks, e.g., telecommunication
networks, such as Sarnoff ’s, Metcalfe’s, and Reed’s law, are often taken as heuristics
to explain the dynamics of the growth of networks of the respective type. The most
prominent phenomena traced back in this way to network effects are a “slow startup”,
the existence of a “critical mass” [16], and strong (supra-exponential) growth after this
mass has been reached. Models for network externalities and their effects on prices
and utility are numerous and detailed, see, e.g., [17, 18] and references therein, while
global models, such as [19] for the possible functional forms of network externalities,
are scarce.
Network utility can spatially either be understood in a global sense as the aggre-
gate value, summed over all members of the network, or as the local, individual value
enjoyed by its single members. In the present context, each case is in turn subdivided
on the temporal axis into the dynamic utility given as a function of the saturation s,
as a relative variable, and the kinematic utility, which is the scaling behaviour of the
utility with the market size n∞.
The aggregate utilities are the simpler ones to discuss. In fact, the only kinematic
aggregate utility in our model is that obtained by the replication of the good and dis-
tribution of it to the members of the network, a contribution which is always of order
O(n∞), like in broadcast networks. The incentive contributes to aggregate utilities only
in a dynamic way, since it is given by
n∞ ·
∫ s
0
vi(s
′) ds′,
which approaches zero for s → 1 due to the zero-sum condition, or is of the order
O(−n∞), more precisely −n∞vc,γ , if a commission is in effect.
The dynamic, individual utility of the network is directly affected by vi. In fact,
in the continuous model there is no other relevant external contribution to individual
utility, since the kinematic, individual utility, defined as the scaling behaviour of vi
with n∞, is O(1) precisely if pi is O(1) (n∞ → ∞), i.e., if the price stays bounded as
the market grows. While this argument holds for large saturations, some care has
to be taken for low ones. Firstly, it might be that the continuous model introduces
artifacts that lead to nontrivial scaling for small s = k/n∞, keeping k fixed while letting
n∞ grow. This is however excluded by the error bound obtained in Proposition 2.4.
The scale-free behaviour of the continuous model is therefore stable for nonzero s. For
small, fixed k = sn∞, and if pi(0) > 0 a scaling of the kinematic, individual utility of
order O(lnn∞) is obtained. This is in accordance with the conventional wisdom that
in pyramid schemes the profiteers realise profits which scale logarithmically with the
number of participants. In conclusion, the incentive introduces a single, independent
network externality which, except for a rather moderate effect on early subscribers,
does not exert a strong effect on the market. This was to be expected since the market
describes has no special structural properties.
Figure 1 a) shows the most basic example of resales revenues and incentives re-
sulting from a constant price. It exhibits the logarithmic singularity present in the
continuous model, and which will always emerge if pi(0) is positive. The singularity is
avoided if pi(0) = 0 as in b) and c). Additionally, in c) the incentive is forced to zero as
s → 1 by letting pi approach zero, and also shows a case where vi is not always mono-
tonic decreasing and pi is still positive. The effect of a commission factor is exhibited in
Figure 1 d).
3. COMPETITION MODEL
To devise a dynamical model for the competition of two goods, say A and B, in a
multi-level market described by the model above, an utility-theoretic approach is suit-
able. Let s• (• = A or B) denote the partial market sizes, or market shares for good
A, and B, respectively. As all other variables introduced below, they are considered as
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dependent variables s• = s•(s) satisfying sA + sB = s. This account manifestly treats
A and B as substitute goods, i.e., agents decide exclusively for either one or the other.
To describe the decision probability ρ• = ρ•(s) for buying A or B, respectively, at
saturation s, at least three factors need to be taken into account. The first is the dis-
tribution of the genuine, individual utilities u• of the good across the population. The
second is the individual utility u•i
def
= u•r − pi• originating from individual utilities u•r
arising from expected resales revenues, where pi• = pi•(s) is the price of the respective
goods. In the present model these two factors are considered as exogenous ones, while
the third one is an endogenous, generic network effect, captured in a contribution u•m
to the utility. It is convenient to introduce, for all utilities, the bias ∆x
def
= xA − xB as a
measure for the advantage gained by deciding for A rather than B.
Let µ• = µ•(u•) be the probability density function (PDF) of the distribution of u•
across the population. The distributions for both goods are taken to be equal and to
depend only on the respective popularities p• ≥ 0, i.e., µ•(u•) = µ(p•, u•). We assume
that µ(x) = 0 for x < 0, and that µ satisfies the principle of stochastic dominance, i.e.,
M(q, x) ≥M(p, x) for p ≥ q,
whereM(p, x) =
∫ x
0
µ(p, y)dy is the cumulative density function (CDF) of µ. With these
settings, the probability that an agent decides to buy A is ρA(∆)
def
= Pr(∆u + ∆ > 0),
where the decision bias ∆ subsumes all other utility contributions to the bias for A.
It follows, with the notation ρA(pA, pB; ∆) = ρA(∆), making the dependency of ρA on
the popularities explicit,
ρA(pA, pB;∆) =
∫ ∞
0
dµA(u)
∫ u+∆
0
µB(u′)
=
∫ ∞
0
dµA(u)MB(u+∆) =
∫ ∞
0
dµA(u)M(u+∆− pB).
(3)
In simple models as used below, the distributions µ• are given in translation form
µ(p•, u•) = µ(0, u• − p•), in which case (3) simplifies to
ρA(pA, pB; ∆) =
∫ ∞
0
dµ(u)M(u+∆+∆p), (4)
where ∆p = pA − pB is the popularity bias.
Proposition 3.1. The function ρA(p, q; ∆) is monotonously increasing in p and∆, monotonously
decreasing in q, and satisfies
i) ρA(p, q;∆) = 1− ρB(p, q;∆),
ii) ρA(p, q;∆) = 1− ρA(q, p;−∆),
iii) ρA(p, q,∆) = ρB(q, p,−∆).
Having at hand the probability ρA(s) = ρA(pA(s), pB(s);∆(s)) to buy A at a given
total saturation, we can write down the fundamental relation governing the dynamics
of the multi-level market in which A and B compete.
sA(s) =
∫ s
0
ρA(s′)ds′. (5)
The second element contributing to the decision bias is the agents’ ex ante estimation
of resales revenues and the incentive, thus defining u•r and in turn the resales revenue
and incentive bias ∆ur and∆ui = ∆ur −∆pi, respectively. Due to limited knowledge
about the market situation, agents are bound to behave according to a rule of bounded
rationality and using partial information. We choose u•r(s)
def
= u•r(s) · ρ•(s), where u•r is
the bare resales revenue u•r(s) =
∫ 1
s
pi•/s′ds′. Here, ρA(s) = ρA(pA(s), pB(s); 0), and
ρB(s) = ρA(pB(s), pA(s); 0) are the probabilities for buying A, B, respectively, governed
merely by popularity. That is, agents expect to gain the resales revenue of an undis-
turbed multi-level market of relative size ρ•(s). Sellers transaction costs, which can
be assumed to be of similar magnitude for both goods, and small for virtual ones are
neglected, as well as commissions by which we focus on the competition between the
goods, exclusively. The assumptions on the agents’ accessible information underlying
this Ansatz are i) the price schedules pi•(s) are public knowledge, ii) s can be estimated
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with good precision, as well as iii) ρ•(s). While i) depends on the mechanism imple-
mented by the multi-level IM system, ii) and iii) can be justified to the end that they
represent information accessible through local measurements within an agent’s com-
munication reach. Summarising, this definition of u•r represents partially but rather
well informed individuals which behave subjectively rational. Further discussion of u•r
is contained in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
As already alluded to in Section 2, the dynamics of multi-level markets is very likely
to be affected by network effects. In fact, in a completely homogeneous market and
in the absence of other externalities influencing an agent’s decision, a network effect
becomes dominant. For, if resellers of good A, say, are rare then a buyer will be very
likely to buy from a reseller of B. In such a situation ρA can become negligible and
the market completely governed by the multiplier effect of resellers of B. We do
not presume such an extreme effect to be prevalent, and, since generic utility-theoretic
treatments of network effects are lacking except for special cases, cf. [17, 16, 18], we
choose an ad hoc, moderate multiplier utility u•m
def
= εs•/s depending on an adjustable
parameter ε. This yields amultiplier bias ∆um = ε(s
A − sB)/s = ε(2sA/s − 1) as the
single endogenous contribution to ρA.
With the specification
∆
def
= ∆ui +∆um = u
A
r ρ
A − uBr ρB − (piA − piB) + ε
(
2sA
s
− 1
)
(6)
the model for the competition of two goods in a multi-level IM market is complete. Note
that (3), (5), (6) present an exactly solvable integral equation for sA. Will will now
examine some special numerical solutions of it.
4. TWO SPECIAL CASES
Though the presented competition model is simple, the space of situations covered
by it is vast, as input data are the price schedules pi•, popularity functions p•, and the
multiplier factor coupling ε, but also the dependency of µ on the popularities. Here we
assume that the latter be of translation form (4), and specify that µ(0, u) is given by
the special Weibull distribution f(u; 1, 2), see Appendix B, in which case ρA takes the
analytical form (7). For pi• and p• we specialise to spike functions
g(s;m)
def
=
{
s/m, for 0 ≤ s ≤ m;
(1− s)/(1−m) for m < s ≤ 1.
Pragmatically, pi• of spike form offer an early-subscriber discount and a late-adopter
rebate, cf. Section 5.3. Technically, they are the simplest price schedules which avoid
an initial singularity, thereby minimising the variance with a discrete model, and cor-
respond to markets closing at finite size.
Besides the market shares s• and the final shares S•
def
= s•(1), the turnovers
t•(s)
def
=
∫ s
0
pi•(s′)ρ•(s′)ds′ =
∫ s
0
pi•(s′)s˙•(s′)ds′ =
∫ s•(s)
0
pi•(s•
′
)ds•
′
and the total turnovers T •
def
= t•(1) are important indicators for the economic perfor-
mance of the competing goods. Note that themaximal turnover that a good can generate
is 1/2 for spike functions. Furthermore, we examine the discrepancy between agents’
expectation and the actual resales revenue they can achieve, similarly calculated as
v•r (s)
def
=
∫ 1
s
pi•(s′)
s•
ρ•(s′)ds′ =
∫ S•
s•(s)
pi•(s•′)
s•′
ds•
′
,
and the resulting actual incentive v•i (s)
def
= v•r (s)− pi•(s).
4.1. Free-Rider Phenomena. To counter free-rider phenomena is the main aim be-
hind the conception of multi-level marketing of virtual goods. In fact, the content dis-
tribution network of multi-level IM systems like the Potato system [11, 12, 20] is very
similar to the peer-to-peer networks commonly used by free riders [21]. By this ratio-
nale, we can compare the performance of a virtual good A with a pirated version B of
it in the same multi-level market. That is, the popularities are equal pA = pB and B
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is free, i.e., piB = 0. Since in this case no confusion can arise, we sometimes drop the
superscript A.
Figure 3 shows how the market evolves in this setting for some selected cases. The
main figures show the market indicators s and 2t (relative to the maximal turnover
1/2). The left and right inlays exhibit the factors contributing to the decision biases,
and the resulting ρ, respectively, a comparison between expected and actual resales
revenues and incentives. The left column has an early peaking price schedule m = 0.1,
entailing an initially very high and then steeply dropping incentive bias (right inlays),
while in the centre and right columns m = 0.5, 0.9, respectively, which in turns leads
to a smaller, but longer lasting positive initial ∆ui. Note the sharp negative peak of
∆ui for m = 0.9, entailing a significant entry deterrence, i.e., ρ < 0.5 at late times. The
right inlays show that the simple rule for ur leads to good estimations for vr, and in
turn vi. Agents tend to underestimate the resales revenues they can achieve at early
times and overestimate them only in an intermediate phase. The increasing influence
of multiplier effects can be observed along the four rows for which ε = 0, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9
from top to bottom.
Even without a multiplier effect present, the incentive can lead to a non-negligible
market share though not dominance. However significant turnovers are not generated
without exploiting the multiplier effect by an initial invitation to enter, i.e., a positive
incentive at early times. For multiplier biases ε ∼= 1 which are comparable to the price
and other biases, good A can reach market dominance and generate over 1/2 of the
maximum turnover. To maximise turnovers, the price schedule must be aligned with
the market growth sA, which is generally difficult. Figure 4 shows the plateaus of SA
and TA in dependence of m and ε. It can be seen that maximisation of turnover and
share are conflicting goals.
4.2. Smash Hits and Sleepers. Scenarios for the competition of two goods are man-
ifold within our model and lack of space prohibits a comprehensive treatment. Here,
as a familiar example, good A is assumed to have a popularity function peaking later
than that of B, i.e., A would commonly be termed a ‘sleeper’ while B can be considered
a ‘smash hit’. Denote by mAp , m
B
p the popularity peaks of A and B, respectively. The
originator of A would like to counter the slow startup effect due to later popularity util-
ising an appropriate price schedule, corresponding to various positionings of the peak
mA of his price function. The price function of B is assumed to be centred, mB = 0.5.
Examples are shown in Figure 5. It can be seen that the final share of A is mostly
small if the multiplier effect is strong, since then the early rise in popularity of B gives
B a persistent advantage. To counter this by a long lasting rebate, i.e., a late price
peak mA is in fact possible, as the first two rows (mA = 0.9, mA = 0.7, respectively)
show. The opposite strategy to start the market by an early peaking price and therefore
high initial incentive can also work, as can be observed in the last two rows (mA = 0.3,
mA = 0.1, respectively). However in this case, the price function of A is misaligned with
the market evolution and hampers the generation of turnovers. In conclusion, to opti-
mise the price function of the sleeper so as to obtain good market shares and turnovers,
is difficult.
5. DISCUSSION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
5.1. Pyramid Schemes and the Issue of Fairness. Attractive as it may be, multi-
level IM has, some similarity with pyramid sales schemes — a publicly discouraged en-
terprise, which is illegal under most jurisdictions. Thus the natural question emerges,
whether IM systems based on super distribution on commission are a tenable mar-
ket mechanism at all, and in particular for virtual goods. In practise, the question is
whether multi-level IM falls in the economical category of legitimate multi-level mar-
keting (also referred to as direct, or network sales), or of illegal pyramid schemes [22].
The key argument for the defence of multi-level IM is that a buyer acquires not only
a void right to resale, but with it a good of positive value, meaning that potential losses
he will incur when he enters the market too late, i.e., too close to saturation to obtain
significant resales revenues, can be partially alleviated by the good’s value.
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An important difference between pyramid schemes operating with physical goods
and multi-level IM is clarified through the analysis of transaction costs. The negative
contribution of sellers’ transaction costs −σ ln s can hit early buyers very hard, since
they have to process many resales. A particular case in the real world to which this
finding corresponds is the detrimental effect of inventory loading in pyramid schemes.
There [23], resellers of the good incur extraordinarily high transaction costs by being
required too keep a large, non-returnable stock of the goods, probably more than they
could ever expect to sell. The penalty arising from this multiplies for early adopters
who actually sell a portion of the goods and are required to reorder stock, which is then
usually possible only in overly large lots. Virtual goods are much tamer in this respect,
since the marginal cost for their replication, as well as the transaction cost for resales,
are small, if not negligible. Stock keeping in itself is not an issue, since virtual goods
allow for principally infinite, lossless replication. Marginal costs for their replication
and redistribution are, more often than not, orders of magnitude smaller than their
value, even if they are embodied on a physical media like a CD, say, for transport.
This is the key difference which makes multi-level IM of virtual goods more viable and
acceptable in many cases than analogous multi-level marketing schemes for physical
goods. In the Potato system for instance, the processing of resales, including accounting,
billing, and charging is fully borne by the central server, for which a percentage of the
price is assigned to the system [20]. That is, the transaction costs are absorbed in the
commission factor and after a buyer has received his resale link from the system in a
one-off transaction, the marginal costs for resales are close to zero.
Thus, the individual utility of the good for the buyers is central to the question of
fairness of multi-level IM. If the good’s utility is close to zero, then the scheme cannot be
considered fair anymore but resembles a pure Ponzi scheme or “Peter-and-Paul” scam.
Formalising, to be fair a multi-level IM scheme should meet the requirement ui ≥ −u
(on average over the buyer population) if fairness is judged on a subjective level, or
vi ≥ −u judged from a forensic perspective. This condition limits the scope in which the
incentive can be predetermined using dynamical forward pricing in multi-level IM, see
Section 5.3 below.
5.2. The Free-Rider Problem. A secondary meaning conventionally attributed to the
term incentive, is that the incentive can be used by the principal who places it as a
means to eventually meet some ends, in particular to minimise the readiness of agents
to take moral hazards, for instance becoming an illegal free-rider [24].
Whether multi-level IM can be successful in meeting the aim to fully replace copy
protection measures and conventional DRM is a question for theoretical economy, cf. [25]
for a treatment of this question in conventional market settings. If the good is freely
available, as, for instance, in the Potato system, then it is not a priori clear that another
equilibrium apart from SA = 0 (only free riders) exists. The zero-sum condition tells
us that, globally, an agent partaking in the IM market is not worse off on average than
one not doing so, and thus a market of any size n∞ > 0 is in fact a global equilibrium.
Assume the agents to be rational and conservative in the sense that they would tend to
copy the good for free in the absence of an additional payoff. Then, a necessary condi-
tion for the market to evolve is that there is an initial phase of in which they can expect
a positive pecuniary incentive, that is ui(s) > 0 for s < s0, s0 > 0.
It is here that the free-rider phenomenon is closely connected to the issue of fairness
and the economical purport of information. For if the zero-sum condition is common
knowledge, then rational agents would always choose the free good since they know
that later potential buyers with negative incentive (actual or subjective) will do so. This
renders the success of real pyramid schemes paradoxical, and shows that the incentive
schedule is at most public knowledge: There must be agents who know that some others
will have a negative incentive but expect them to enter the market nonetheless. This is
the reason for modelling the decision mechanism of agents using a rule of bounded ra-
tionality, as in Section 3. As shown in Section 4.1, an initial invitation to enter through
a positive incentive can, within the scope of this model and if combined with a (small)
multiplier effect, turn multi-level IM into a functioning tool to counter the free-rider
phenomenon.
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The presence of the free version can be seen as an exogenous factor negatively affect-
ing the individual utility u, and in turn the scope for the determination of the incentive.
This is the classical dilemma for the marketing of digital goods and the one addressed
by copy protection and DRM. To offer a pragmatical conjecture, it might make sense to
differentiate the freely available version of the good from the one distributed through
the multi-level IM system, by adding some value and copy protection to the latter,
though this would be a partial return to conventional DRM measures, maybe in the
“softer” forms of watermarking, personalisation, and fingerprinting, to enable trace-
ability of illegal copies [5].
5.3. Dynamical Forward Pricing. For the operator of a multi-level IM system, the
primary goal to maximise the revenues for the originator of the good through his share
of the commissions, contains the secondary sub-goal of promoting the distribution of
the good, i.e., maximising the market penetration. A central, new result of the present
study is the possibility, via the inversion formulae (1) and (2), to dynamically adapt the
incentive during the evolution of the market if the operator of the system controls the
price as an external parameter. This is useful to turn multi-level IM systems with
dynamical forward pricing into tools for market mechanism design, to achieve the
mentioned goals. While dynamical forward pricing is not a new concept in the theory of
information goods [26], this possibility has, in the context multi-level incentive markets
for virtual or physical goods, not yet been widely considered in the literature.
Figure 1 shows the most basic possibilities for price functions. A constant price as in
a) is associated with a strong favouritism of early buyers, while later market entrants
are increasingly penalised. A typical example for what is conventionally termed an
early subscriber discount is shown in b). In real markets this is often used as a means
to spur the distribution of the good in an early stage of market development, i.e., to
counteract a slow startup effect. For the marketing of virtual goods, such an initial in-
vitation to enter becomes important, in particular if the good is freely available through
legal or illegal channels, and therefore early buyers cannot be sure about their poten-
tial resales revenues which depend logarithmically on the market size (remember that
vi(k = sn∞) scales as lnn∞). The price associated with the incentive in b) is monoto-
nous increasing, resulting in a double penalty to later buyers who pay more and receive
less incentive. Buyers who enter this market for some reason at late times will notice
that they are disfavoured, and possibly tend to become frustrated. The third example
in Figure 1 c) improves on b) by letting the price vanish when the market reaches sat-
uration. This vi combines a discount for early subscribers with a rebate for very late
ones who finally obtain the good gratuitously. This pricing can therefore potentially
be used to spur the distribution of the good in early market phases through low price
and high incentive, as well as at late times, when the good itself might have lost in
utility and the market looses dynamics. If we assume that the market has a positive
growth dynamics in an intermediate phase associated with a high demand and maybe
a higher individual utility, then it is also reasonable to let the prices peak and lower
the incentive during this phase, as in c). Deepness and position of the minimum of vi
can be adjusted almost arbitrarily. Finally, d) shows the relatively limited effect that a
collector has on the incentive. In particular it can be seen that the point at which the
incentive becomes negative is not significantly shifted by the increasing commission
factor.
For an implementation of dynamical forward pricing, information on the market
dynamics becomes essential, in particular the current size n(t) of the market must be
known. This is in fact the case, e.g., in the Potato system, where a central server counts
every single acquisition of the good. A much more difficult to determine variable is the
absolute market size n∞, necessary to calculate the saturation s = n/n∞. Although
one might try to estimate n∞ by market research, comparison with earlier runs of
the system for different goods, or other means of educated guessing, a more pragmatic
solution suggests itself. Namely, as in the last example in Figure 1, setting the price
to zero after some finite time, respectively at an a priori given n∞ obtains a natural
condition for closure of the market.
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Market closure in this manner runs somewhat counter to the aim of maximising
shares yet the effect on the turnover can be limited if the price becomes small enough
at late times. Market closure yields the additional benefit of effectively rewarding late
buyers by a rebate, which makes additional sense when looking beyond the level of a
single run if the IM system. Then, the possible frustration of late buyers with low vi
might deter them from partaking in the IM market for a following good. Note that such
a procedure is not too uncommon for goods whose value is to a large extent determined
by its information content — although on a larger timescale than we would envisage
for multi-level IM. For instance, many academic publishers are now distributing classic
scholarly titles for free. Also, many legal codifications of intellectual property rights
foresee a forfeiture after a certain period.
Information is an essential tool for running a multi-level IM system. It is desirable
to decouple the agents’ decisions from the price and bind it more strongly to the incen-
tive. For that, a precondition is the proper information of the market about the expected
incentive, that is, viable IM depends to some extent on market transparency. The exam-
ples of Section 4 show that agents can have a rather precise estimate on their incentive
using local information. The operator of a multi-level IM system could support this
by providing some information of his own, but perhaps not all, since particularly the
absolute market size of a certain is a potentially useful information for competitors.
Namely, in a competitive situation the additional difficulty arises that the s cannot be
determined by a single party which may at best know its own partial market size. For
instance, in order to avoid closing the market to early, close observation of competi-
tors prices, respectively, activity of peer-to-peer networks distributing the good to free
riders, becomes indispensable.
Mixed forms of dynamical price settings can be envisaged, e.g., a positive correlation
of pi with the buying frequency, combined with a frequency or price threshold below
which the price is set to zero and the market closed. In any case, as Section 4.1 and
Section 4.2 showed designing the optimal price schedule is a complex task, in particular
in competitive situations.
5.4. Roots and Market Cannibalisation. For the originator of the good, whom we
assume for the time being also to control the IM system, there are basically two ways
to extract revenues from the market: He can either act as the market’s root. That
is he is the first reseller, paying himself a price equal to the original production cost
of the good. Or he can use a commission model (combinations of both cases are of
course thinkable). The analysis of network effects yields an argument that the former
possibility is in principle inferior to the latter. For the originator’s revenues scale with
the total revenues in the market as O(n∞) for large market sizes, while the revenues
of a root go only with O(lnn∞). This is in essence a consequence of the fact that a pure
multi-level market cannot easily be monopolised by a single reseller, or even a group of
them. In turn it explains why commission models are a standard practise in multi-level
marketing.
This leads us to a caveat with respect to the crucial assumption underlying our mar-
ket model, namely homogeneity. If the market is biased in the sense that there are
groups of agents with systematically higher trading capacities than others, this as-
sumption breaks down. Heuristically, considering only an average agent in a structure-
less market should be a good approximation if the number of potential participants is
large and consists of a more or less homogeneous group of individuals, like one with spe-
cial personal preferences, e.g., musical. In practise, large music labels running direct
sale web sites are the counterexample where this heuristics is most blatantly violated.
If such a label concurrently offers one of their titles through a multi-level IM system,
the chances of the average buyer to buy from this root source are much higher than to
meet any other market participant. The same argument exhibits the imminent danger
that the market can be cannibalised at an early stage by a player with overwhelmingly
high communication capacity, e.g., a popular web site, who could then obtain a practi-
cal monopoly. Some studies indicate that monopoly creation could be a rather natural
effect in e-commerce [27]. While the originator of the good is not too affected by this
phenomenon if he uses a commission model, the other buyers’ incentives are always
12 A. U. SCHMIDT
negatively affected. To what extent the market can be levelled by means of the IM sys-
tem, e.g., by providing equal communication capacities to all participants, restricting
or controlling resale volumes or frequencies, etc., warrants separate discussion.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Let us briefly note some directions for further work. On the theoretical side it would
be desirable to improve the both the monetary flux model and the competition model
to account for, e.g., market inhomogeneities in the former and further externalities’
influence on the decision mechanism of the agents in the latter. In particular, a better
justified model for the multiplier effect and a proper incorporation of other network
effects is wanting. More refined simulations of multi-level markets in the framework of
agent-based computational economics [28], can be useful. A proper treatment of multi-
level markets and the competition of goods therein from the viewpoint of theoretical
economics should also answer questions of optimality, equilibria, and their stability.
The free-rider problem in multi-level IM should also be treated in a more theoretical
approach using the principal-agent model [24] and aiming at describing the effect of the
incentive on the moral hazard incurred by the agents.
Pragmatically and in order to design proper market mechanisms and actual systems
for multi-level IM, the most daunting task from the present viewpoint is to ensure equal
opportunities for resellers in the market, i.e., to practically corroborate the theoretical
assumption of homogeneity.
APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
Proof of Proposition 2.1. For ε > 0 consider∫ 1
ε
ds
∫ 1
s
pi(s′)
s′
ds′ =
∫ 1
ε
ds′
∫ s′
ε
pi(s′)
s′
ds
=
∫ 1
ε
s′ − ε
s′
pi(s′) ds′
=
∫ 1
ε
pi(s′) ds′ − ε
∫ 1
ε
pi(s′)
s′
ds′.
If pi(s) is bounded on [0, 1] as assumed then the second term is of order O(ε ln ε) and
therefore vanishes as εց 0. The first term converges to∫ 1
0
pi(s) ds,
as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2. For pi ∈ V, (Kpi)(s) is a continuously differentiable function in
the interval (0, 1]with derivative−pi(s)/s−p˙i(s). The latter is of order 1/s as sց 0 since
pi stays bounded at zero. For the same reason, the integral in Kpi is O(ln s) (s → 0),
which is o(1/s), showing (Kpi)(s) = o(1/s) (s→ 0). Kpi satisfies the zero-sum condition
due to Proposition 2.1. Thus Kpi ∈ W and we can apply Kˇ to obtain
(KˇKpi)(s) = Kˇ
(∫ 1
σ
pi(s′)
s′
ds′ − pi(σ)
)
= −1
s
∫ s
0
(
−pi(σ)
σ
− p˙i(σ)
)
σ dσ
=
1
s
(∫ s
0
pi(σ) dσ −
∫ s
0
pi(σ) dσ +
[
pi(σ)σ
]s
0
)
= pi(s).
On the other hand, if v˙i = O(1/σ) (σ → 0), then the last calculation showed that Kˇ can
be applied to it and obtains a differentiable function in (0, 1)which extends continuously
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to [0, 1]. That is Kˇvi ∈ V and we calculate for s > 0
(KKˇvi)(s) = −
∫ 1
s
1
s′2
∫ s′
0
σv˙i(σ) dσ ds
′ +
1
s
∫ s
0
σv˙i(σ) dσ
= −
∫ 1
s
v˙i(s
′) ds′ +
∫ 1
0
σv˙i(σ) dσ
= vi(s)− vi(1) + lim
εց0
(
−
∫ 1
ε
vi(σ) dσ +
[
σvi(σ)
]1
ε
+
∫ ε
0
σv˙i(σ) dσ
)
In the last step, we used continuity of vi at 1. Now, since vi = o(1/σ), v˙i = O(1/σ)
(σ → 0), the limit can be assumed and yields
= vi(s)− vi(1) +
∫ 1
0
vi(σ) dσ + vi(1)
= vi(s),
where the zero-sum condition has been used. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Partial integration yields∫ s
0
σv˙i(σ) dσ =
∫ s
0
vi(σ)− svi(s),
where we have used that σvi(σ) → 0 for σ ց 0 if pi is C1, cf. Proposition 2.2. The
result follows upon inserting the above equation into the inequality pi(s) > 0 and using
Proposition 2.2. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4. We have for sn∞ integer
|vi(s)− vi(sn∞)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
s
pi(s′)
s′
ds′ −
n∞∑
k′=sn∞+1
pi(k′/n∞)
k′ − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
= lim
εց0
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ 1+ε
s
pi(s′)
(
1
s′
−
n∞∑
k′=sn∞+1
δ(s′ − k′/n∞)
s′
)
ds′
∣∣∣∣∣
where we extended pi continuously in a small interval [1, 1 + ε], and used Dirac’s δ-
function to incorporate the sum in the integral. Now, the non-negative factor pi can be
drawn out to estimate
≤ pimax|Ψ(sn∞)− ln s−Ψ(n∞)|
= pimax
(
|Ψ(sn∞)− ln sn∞|+ |lnn∞ −Ψ(n∞)|
)
Using the asymptotic expansion of the Ψ function for r a positive integer, see [14,
p. 295], we obtain
|ln r −Ψ(r)| ≤ 1
2r
+
n∑
m=1
|B2m|
2mr2m
, for n ≥ 0,
where B2m is the 2m-th Bernoulli number. From this follows the claim. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The assertions on monotonicity follow from positivity of proba-
bility distributions (for∆) and stochastic dominance (for p, respectively, q). Symmetries
i) and ii), from which iii) follows directly, are easy calculations. 
APPENDIX B. WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES
The Weibull distribution is widely used in reliability and lifetime estimation. It is
defined by the PDF
f(x; a, b)
def
= ba−bxb−1e−(x/a)
b
χ(0,∞)(x),
where χ(0,∞)(x) is the characteristic function of the positive half axis. For a = 1, b = 2
it reduces to the utility distribution used in Section 4
µ(x)
def
= f(x; a, b) = 2xe−x
2
χ(0,∞)(x),
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the CDF of which is
µ(x) = 1− e−x2χ(0,∞)(x).
If µ (p•,u•) is given in translation form, formula (4) yields for ρA(∆), ∆ ≥ 0,
ρA(∆) = 1 +
√
2pi
4
∆e−∆
2/2
(
1− erf(∆/
√
2)
)
− e−∆2/2. (7)
These functions are shown in Figure 2 where it is apparent that ρA is concave for∆ > 0,
in this case, and ρA(−∆) = 1− ρA(∆), as follows from Proposition 3.1.
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FIGURE 1. Examples for prices pi (dashed), expected resales revenues
vr (thin solid), and incentives vi (thick solid). a) pi = 1, vr = − ln s,
vi = − ln s − 1. b) pi(s) = sin(pis)/(pis) − cos(pis), vr = sin(pis)/(pis),
vi = cos(pis). c) pi(s) = sin(pis), vr = Si(pi) − Si(pis), vi = Si(pi) −
Si(pis) − sin(pis), where Si is the integral sine function. d) Price as in
c) with commission factor γ varying from 1 to 0.5 in steps of size 0.1.
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FIGURE 2. Decision probability ρA(∆) resulting from popularity dis-
tributions given by translates of the Weibull distribution f(x; 1, 2).
The PDF and CDF of f(x; 1, 2) are shown in the inlay.
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FIGURE 3. Example market evolutions in the free-rider setting.
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FIGURE 4. Final shares (left) and total turnovers (right) in the free-
rider setting.
18 A. U. SCHMIDT
FIGURE 5. Competition between sleeper and smash hit. Market
shares sA are solid, turnovers 2tA dashed.
